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1INTRODUCTION
hree years have passed since the conclusion 
of the latest military assault on the Gaza Strip. 
Most of the Palestinian enclave still lies in ruin. 
Many Gazans continue to lack permanent 
housing, living in shelters and other forms of 
temporary accommodation. An absence of 
basic infrastructure—electricity, clean water, 
sewage treatment, and waste management—
has blighted the daily lives of Gaza’s 1.9 
million citizens.2 While the reconstruction 
process trudges along, a lack of employment 
opportunities has left 42 percent of the total 
labor force unemployed, rising to 60 percent 
among Gaza’s youth.3 Gaza can barely sustain 
the lives of its current inhabitants. With an 
annual population growth of 2.4 percent, 
the situation in the Palestinian enclave is 
becoming increasingly grim as humanitarian 
and reconstruction eforts fail to expand.4
Meanwhile, the enduring Israeli siege and naval 
blockade of Gaza exacerbates these problems, 
closing Gaza of to the outside world. he 
conditions in Gaza amount to those of an 
outdoor prison; a collective punishment 
that adds to the despair and frustration that 
arises from the enduring Israeli occupation 
and the need for a political settlement to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conlict. While a inal 
status agreement for peace between the 
Israelis and Palestinians seems out of reach, 
the humanitarian problems posed by the 
substandard living conditions in Gaza require 
the attention of international actors associated 
with the peace process. If the living conditions 
in Gaza do not improve in the near future, the 
region will inevitably experience another round 
of conlict, more violent than the last. 
his policy brieing examines the organization 
of the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism 
(GRM)—the temporary tripartite agreement 
between the Palestinian Authority (PA), the 
Israeli government, and the United Nations 
that has governed the reconstruction of Gaza 
since the 2014 war. It will describe the failures 
of the GRM, arguing that it has not advanced 
the reconstruction of Gaza as originally 
intended. Instead, the GRM has not only 
hindered progress on reconstruction, but it has 
also institutionalized the Israeli blockade. 
he authors will conclude with recommendations 
on how to dismantle and replace the GRM, 
while accounting for political shifts in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conlict and changes in global 
attitudes toward post-conlict reconstruction 
projects. he brieing will also suggest ways to 
improve the quality of life for Gaza’s people. 
After all, despite the absence of a political 
solution to the conlict at large, the international 
community should not lose sight of resolving 
1 Sultan Barakat is the former director of research at the Brookings Doha Center. He is a professor at the University of York and Director of 
the Center for Conlict and Humanitarian Studies at the Doha Institute. Firas Masri is a research assistant at the Brookings Doha Center. 
he authors wish to thank those who provided their helpful feedback and insights for this paper. he authors also acknowledge the assistance 
and support of the Brookings Doha Center staf, especially Fatema Alhashemi and Sumaya Attia. 
2 United Nations Oice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Afairs (UNOCHA), “he Gaza Strip: he Humanitarian Impact of the 
Blockade,” November 14, 2016, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-strip-humanitarian-impact-blockade-november-2016.
3 Ibid.
4 Central Intelligence Agency, “Gaza Strip,” World Factbook, July 25, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/gz.html.
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the humanitarian crisis that continues to afect 
the civilian population caught in the middle of 
an intractable political conlict.  
IMPEDIMENTS TO RECONSTRUCTION
Several factors account for the slow 
reconstruction of Gaza. he irst is restricted 
access into and out of the territory, enforced 
by both Israeli and Egyptian authorities. he 
Coordination of Government Activities in 
the Territories (COGAT), a unit of the Israeli 
Ministry of Defense, approves any construction 
or humanitarian convoys crossing into Gaza 
from two entry points: Kerem Shalom in the 
south for commercial goods and Erez in the 
north for people (see Figure I).5 Egyptian 
authorities control access via the Rafah border 
crossing, which was only opened for 32 days in 
2015, 44 days in 2016, and 10 non-consecutive 
days in 2017 (as of May).6 Due to these 
restrictions, humanitarian and construction 
supplies have not been arriving in the quantities 
essential to efectively rebuild Gaza and bolster 
potential for economic growth that exists in 
the territory. 
5 UNOCHA, “he Gaza Strip.”
6 UNOCHA, “Gaza Crossings’ Operation Status: Monthly Update-April 2017,” May 17, 2017, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-
crossings-operations-status-monthly-update-april-2017. 
Figure I: Map of Gaza with Crossing Points
Source: UNOCHA
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he ongoing political rifts between Hamas—
the de facto government in Gaza—on one 
hand, and the Fatah-led PA, Egypt, and 
Israel on the other, only exacerbates the 
problem. Both Egypt and Israel do not trust 
Hamas and continue to consider it a security 
threat. Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-
Sissi hinted that he would regularly open 
the Rafah border crossing if the PA were to 
provide security in Gaza instead of Hamas.7 
his would not only allow for an increase 
in the amount of construction materials 
coming into Gaza, but it would also bring 
these goods at a cheaper cost—due to the 
lower tax duties placed on goods entering 
through Rafah, as opposed to the Israeli 
border crossings.8 
Funding issues have also impeded 
reconstruction. Despite the high-level of 
enthusiasm expressed during the Cairo 
Conference in October 2014, where many of 
the numerous pledges were made to rebuild 
Gaza, much of the donations remain unfulilled. 
Of the $5.4 billion pledged at the conference, 
over half was committed to reconstruction 
projects in Gaza—but only 51 percent had been 
disbursed as of December 31, 2016.9 he Arab 
States—Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United Arab Emirates—made some 
of the largest pledges during the conference; 
however, the bloc is also behind the bulk of 
unfulilled payments—87 percent of unfulilled 
pledges are from the Gulf, and 78 percent of the 
Gulf ’s pledges remain unfulilled (see Table I).10 
7 Initially, the aim was to replace the Hamas security forces at the border, but it seems that Egypt was eventually willing to accept Hamas 
security at the border with PA support/collaboration. Rasha Abou Jalal, “Egypt Announces Deal to Open Rafah Crossing, But When Will It 
Actually Open?” al-Monitor, November 26, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/egypt-pa-deal-rafah-crossing-open-
hamas-opposition.html.
8 Quartet oicial, interview with authors, Doha, Qatar, February 23, 2016.
9 Michael R. Gordon, “Conference Pledges $5.4 Billion to Rebuild Gaza Strip,” New York Times, October 12, 2014, https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/10/13/world/middleeast/us-pledges-212-million-in-new-aid-for-gaza.html; he World Bank, “Reconstructing Gaza—Donor 
Pledges,” December 31, 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/rebuilding-gaza-donor-pledges#4.
10 Ibid.
Table I: Disbursement Status by Donor of Pledged Support to Gaza (USD Million) 
Donor
Bahrain
Kuwait
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates
GCC Total
Worldwide Total
Pledged Support  
to Gaza
6.5
200
1,000
500
200
1,906.5
3,499
Disbursement Ratio  
of Support to Gaza
79%
24%
22%
18%
30%
22%
51%
Source: World Bank, 2016
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Various factors explain the slow trickle of donor 
funding. For donors outside the Middle East, 
donor fatigue seems to represent one reason 
behind the slow disbursal. Donors appear to 
appreciate the severity of the humanitarian 
situation in Gaza, as demonstrated by the 
pledges made in Cairo. Despite this, a sense 
of futility took hold over some of the Western 
donors, as they saw their previous investments 
go up in the lames of war for the second, 
and in some cases, third time, making them 
apprehensive about providing further funding.
On the other hand, the Middle Eastern 
states that pledged donations to Gaza’s 
reconstruction have explicitly and implicitly 
demonstrated political positions that have 
relected a polarization into two camps 
following the Arab Spring. On one level or 
another, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and 
the UAE oppose Hamas, having expressed 
concern over the organization’s ties to the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Countries in opposition 
to Hamas do not want to send money to 
Gaza to avoid bolstering local support for 
the Islamist movement. hey also rely on 
the assumption that slower reconstruction 
would erode Hamas’ legitimacy in the Strip, 
ultimately forcing a return to the political 
arrangements that preceded the organization’s 
2007 unilateral takeover. 
Meanwhile, Qatar and Turkey have delivered 
the two largest aid packages to Gaza out 
of all Middle Eastern countries ($216 and 
$139 million respectively). hey have done 
so because of their close political ties to 
Hamas—having exhibited fewer reservations 
than their regional neighbors in providing 
assistance via Gaza’s de facto government. For 
example, in July 2016 Qatar contributed $30 
million to pay the salaries of a considerable 
section of Gaza’s public servants, who were 
left without pay since 2013 because of a 
disagreement between the PA and Hamas.11 
However, those generous deliveries are rare, 
and the shortage of donor funds continues 
to slow the reconstruction of Gaza. Since 
the World Bank released its pledge disbursal 
report in December 2016, funding did not 
see any increases. 
In fact, barring a inal political solution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conlict, donors will 
continue to reluctantly donate money to 
Gaza, a place that faces a perpetual cycle 
of destruction and reconstruction. Above 
all, a political settlement between the 
Israeli government and the Palestinians is 
the measure that would most dramatically 
improve the conditions in Gaza. However, 
with the creation of the most conservative 
Israeli governing coalition in the Jewish state’s 
history, a lack of political will on the part of 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
to negotiate with the Palestinians, and the 
intransigence of the PA and Hamas to form 
a unity government, a inal settlement to end 
the decadeslong conlict seems like a fantasy. 
WHAT IS THE GAZA  
RECONSTRUCTION MECHANISM?
Given these obstacles, the GRM was initiated 
in September 2014 in an attempt to reconstruct 
Gaza through a multi-tiered mechanism 
involving the Israeli government, the PA, and 
the U.N. At the time of the GRM’s inception, 
Robert Serry—the U.N. Special Coordinator 
for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO)—
promoted it as a means of coordination between 
the PA and the Israeli government to expedite 
reconstruction. It was instated to ease the low 
of construction materials into Gaza by creating 
11 Reuters, “Qatar Says Gives $30 Million to Pay Gaza Public Sector Workers,” July 22, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-gaza-
qatar-idUSKCN1021AQ.
5a direct line of communication between 
COGAT and the PA, with the U.N. serving 
as an intermediary between the two parties. 
During the GRM’s announcement, Serry 
argued that it would not only address Israeli 
security concerns, but it would also reinforce 
donor conidence, providing necessary funding 
for such reconstruction to take place.12 
hrough the GRM, an extensive system of 
inspection and monitoring of imports to 
Gaza was created. he theory behind this 
three-party arrangement was that by satisfying 
the security concerns of Israel, the U.N. and 
PA would speed up import of construction 
materials into Gaza, and as such help rebuild 
it in the aftermath of the destruction caused by 
the war, while simultaneously creating badly 
needed job opportunities for young Gazans 
in the private construction sector. UNSCO 
deined the GRM as a short-term arrangement, 
although it did not establish an end date 
for the mechanism.13 Acknowledging the 
unsustainability of the situation in Gaza, Serry 
remarked that, “We consider this temporary 
mechanism [the GRM] an important step 
towards the objective of lifting all remaining 
closures.”14 On paper, the general objective 
of the GRM was “to enable construction and 
reconstruction work at the large scale now 
required in the Gaza Strip.”15 his aim was 
detailed in four corollary objectives:
(a) Enable the Government of Palestine 
to lead the reconstruction efort;   
(b) enable the Gazan private sector;   
(c) assure donors that their investments 
in construction work in Gaza will 
be implemented without delay; (d) 
address Israeli security concerns related 
to the use of construction and other 
“dual use” material.16
On the face of it, the GRM seemed like a positive 
outcome at the time, working in favor of all 
involved. However, many of those objectives 
were lost during implementation. It quickly 
became evident that the way the GRM was 
conceived gave Israel’s COGAT the inal word 
over any construction project or construction 
materials entering Gaza. hus, Israel’s security 
concerns were prioritized. Meanwhile, neither 
the PA nor Hamas were given much say over 
the rebuilding process and leadership by the 
“Government of Palestine” was minimized. In 
fact, the mechanism has failed even to address 
the third objective. Construction has proceeded 
at a slow pace and with many delays, which has 
discouraged donors from increasing the speed 
at which they disburse aid to Gaza.17 
he purpose of establishing any political tool 
hinges upon creating a highly eicient and 
functioning system to reach a deined goal. In 
theory, that should be the primary purpose of 
the GRM. It should provide a clear channel 
of communication between COGAT, the PA, 
the U.N., and members of Gaza’s civil society 
to facilitate reconstruction projects in the 
Palestinian enclave. However, as the following 
sections will show, given the underlying causes 
of the conlict and the absence of political will 
12 U.N. News Centre, “Middle East: U.N. Envoy Announces Deal on Reconstruction in Gaza,” September 16, 2014, http://www.un.org/
apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48730#.V2pUul96Uk.
13 UNSCO, “Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism,” October 2014, 6, http://www.aidwatch.ps/sites/default/iles/resource-ield_media/gaza_re-
construction_mechanism_full-text.pdf.
14 Robert Serry, “Brieing to the Security Council on the Situation in the Middle East,” UNSCO, September 16, 2014, 3, http://www.unsco.
org/Documents/Statements/MSCB/2008/Security%20Council%20Brieing%20-%2016%20September%202014.pdf.
15 Oice of the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, “Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism Fact Sheet,” UNSCO, October 20, 
2014, 1, http://www.unsco.org/Gaza%20Reconstruction%20Mechanism%20Fact%20Sheet%209%20October%202014.pdf.
16 Ibid.
17 United Nations, “Security Council Brieing on the Situation in the Middle East,” May 25, 2016, http://www.un.org/undpa/en/speeches-
statements/25052016/middle-east; he World Bank, “Reconstructing Gaza.”
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to make the mechanism work as intended, 
the GRM ended up creating a cumbersome 
bureaucracy, which, after three years, represents 
at best, a system of conlict management, not 
resolution; and at worst, an institutionalization 
of the Israeli siege of Gaza. 
LAGGING PROGRESS
he 2014 war caused a wide array of damages 
to 171,000 homes, ranging from minor 
damages to complete destruction. As Table II 
illustrates, the cost of repairs to these homes 
ranges from $5,000 or less to $35,000.18 From 
the 171,000 afected homes, about 61,086 still 
need repairs or require new construction, but 
have not yet received conirmation for funding 
as of May 2017. In other words, more than a 
third of the afected homes still require work. 
Shelter Cluster estimates that the completion 
of reconstruction will not occur until August 
2018, a year after the initial deadline.19 
18 Shelter Cluster Palestine, “Key Figures (May 2017),” June 12, 2017, http://www.shelterpalestine.org/Upload/Doc/b6072f7d-f789-4a14-
8f37-cb3f70d46614.pdf; Shelter Cluster Palestine, “Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism – How to Engage? (Version 3)” July 31, 2015, 8, 
http://shelterpalestine.org/Upload/Doc/b9b914b2-d2a7-4885-a7b2-df42cef23b91.pdf. 
19 Ibid. his estimate is based of the assumption that all pledges will be met. Given the slow trickle of donor funds, this projected comple-
tion seems unlikely.
20 Number of units that received funding conirmation in 2017.
Table II: Reconstruction Progress by Category and Average Cost (# of units, USD) 
Source: Shelter Cluster Palestine
Damage Level
Damage  
Description
Average cost of  
Reconstruction
Number of Units
Completed
In Progress
Funded20
Remaining Units
Minor Damage
Windows and 
doors and  
small holes in  
external walls
Less than $5,000
147,500
84,308
8,857
0
54,335
Major Damage
Damages are  
in part of the  
house and  
some parts are  
still inhabited
More than
$5,000
5,700
1,794
898
58
2,950
Severe Damage
Damages are in  
essential parts  
of the house.  
It is uninhabitable 
until major work 
takes place.
$10,000 to
$18,000
6,800
6,768
82
0
0
Destroyed
Destroyed or  
beyond repair.  
he housing unit 
needs demolition 
and reconstruction.
$35,000
11,000
4,274
1,516
1,409
3,801
Total
—
—
171,000
97,144
11,303
1,467
61,086
7Nearly three years after the war in Gaza and two 
and a half years after the introduction of the GRM, 
the limited progress made in reconstruction 
has demonstrated the inefectuality of the 
mechanism. According to a U.N. Oice for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Afairs 
(UNOCHA) report, “at the height of the 
2014 war, nearly 500,000 people, 28 percent 
of the population, were displaced from their 
homes.” From the 16,000 families that were 
still displaced between August and December 
2015, 62.5 percent claimed that they rented 
accommodation, and of that group, 50 percent 
feared eviction from their rented living quarters. 
As of April 2016, approximately 75,000 
people were estimated to remain displaced.21 
hose numbers demonstrate that displacement 
continues to be an issue and the GRM did not 
efectively expedite reconstruction.
A LABYRINTH OF BUREAUCRACY
A look at the approval process gives a glimpse 
into the large amount of bureaucracy created 
by the GRM, which partially explains the 
lag. Before a family in Gaza receives any 
construction materials, they must go through 
a multi-step process (see Figure II).22 First, the 
PA Ministry of Public Works and Housing 
(MoPWH) completes a survey of the damage 
to the homes. he assessment includes the 
amount of damage incurred, as well as the 
amount and type of building materials required 
for a particular reconstruction project. It then 
uploads the assessment to the joint COGAT, 
PA, and U.N. database established under the 
GRM. he PA submits the assessment to the 
High-Level Steering Team (HLST), comprised 
of representatives from COGAT, the PA, and the 
U.N. At this point, COGAT can either approve 
or veto the assessment. After the approval process, 
the HLST then provides the beneiciary with 
coupons, giving them permission to purchase 
construction materials from approved vendors. 
his authorization process must be completed 
for each step of construction—including laying 
a house’s foundation, framing, plastering, and 
inishing work.23
21 UNOCHA, “Gaza: Internally Displaced Persons,” April 2016, 1, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-internally-displaced-persons-april-2016.
22 he Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism, “An Agreement between the Government of Palestine (GOP) and the Government of Israel (GOI),” 
accessed July 16, 2017, http://grm.report/.
23 UNSCO, “Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism,” 2; Member of Gaza civil society, interview with the authors, Doha, Qatar, January 20, 2016.
Figure II: Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism Monitoring Streams 
Source: GRM
Residential 
Stream
Vendor
Monitoring
Project  
Stream
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Structural issues with the GRM arrangement 
complicate an already cumbersome process. he 
database, which governs the approval process, 
is run not by authorities in Gaza but by the PA 
in the West Bank, some 160 kilometers from 
the commercial good entry point at Kerem 
Shalom.24 Another one of the PA’s duties is to 
funnel money to construction eforts through 
the Ministry of Finance. his method was 
intended to ensure transparency while building 
the PA’s capacity but ended up contributing 
signiicantly to slowing down the rebuilding 
process. According to the GRM agreement, the 
duration between registering a beneiciary and 
their receiving approval to purchase aggregate, 
reinforcing bars, and cement (ABC), “shall 
be limited to two working days.”25 However, 
in actuality, the waiting period has often 
amounted to weeks, or even months after each 
stage of construction.26 
LACK OF LOCAL OWNERSHIP
Notably absent from the GRM arrangement 
were Hamas and Gaza’s civil society.27 In 
addition to contributing to the aforementioned 
delays, by not consulting with Gaza’s local 
communities, UNSCO efectively allowed the 
process of reconstruction to be non-inclusive—
leaving the fate of Gaza’s communities up to 
people who do not have as great a stake in the 
rebuilding process. his has caused a crippling 
lack of communication between Gaza’s civil 
society and the three entities that developed 
the mechanism.
On a basic level, members of Gaza’s civil society 
were not consulted during the development of 
the GRM, nor were representatives from Hamas’s 
political wing. hus, the needs of Gaza’s people 
did not receive appropriate consideration during 
the conception of the mechanism. Gazans were 
only consulted on the reconstruction efort 
after the conception of the GRM, so they had 
no choice but to accept a program developed 
without their consent. Only after the start of 
the GRM did the authorities associated with it 
conduct a survey assessing the damage and the 
needs of Gazans. 
In fact, civil society groups in Gaza did not 
see the full text of the GRM agreement until 
over a year after its conception. hese groups 
would probably have never seen the speciics 
of the agreement had they not demanded its 
publication by UNSCO.28 he only document 
on the GRM, published by UNSCO, was a 
fact sheet that summarized the procedures, 
without going over the iner points regarding 
the monitoring process.29 hus, from the 
perspective of the people of Gaza, a group 
of outsiders concocted plans to rebuild the 
territory while lacking any knowledge of the 
actual needs of the local communities.
24 IRIN News, “What’s in the U.N.’s New Gaza Agreement?” September 19, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2014/09/19/whats-
uns-new-gaza-agreement.
25 UNSCO, “Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism,” 3.
26 Shlomi Eldar, “Why Young Gazans Need Cement to Get Married,” al-Monitor, December 3, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2015/12/israel-gaza-cement-housing-shortage-youngsters-tunnels.html.
27 Middle East Monitor, “Hamas: ‘We have Alternatives should Reconstruction Fail,’” November 26, 2014, https://www.middleeastmonitor.
com/20141126-hamas-we-have-alternatives-should-reconstruction-fail.
28 Palestinian Civil Society Organizations, “Letter to UNSCO,” November 26, 2015, http://www.ewash.org/news/letter-unsco.
29 UNSCO, “Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism Fact Sheet.”
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While Gazans have little ownership over 
the mechanism, the Israelis have too much. 
With the GRM in place, the Israelis can now 
point to the mechanism as a justiication for 
controlling the goods that enter the Palestinian 
enclave. Due to the potential dual-use nature—
civilian and military application—of some 
of the construction materials entering Gaza, 
the GRM was initially proposed to reassure 
Israel through instituting a “neutral” apparatus 
that would inspect all materials entering the 
territory. Although the GRM was successful in 
establishing an indirect line of communication 
between the Palestinians and Israelis to ease the 
low of construction materials, in actuality, it 
institutionalized the Israeli blockade by giving 
the Israeli government the highest authority 
over the reconstruction process. In efect, the 
GRM has moved beyond being a conidence 
building measure, and transformed into a 
political tool in the hands of Israel.
Even with the sophisticated system of inspection 
and monitoring of imports, COGAT still inds 
ways to further impede the reconstruction 
process. Despite expansions made to the 
Kerem Shalom crossing—the checkpoint 
where commercial goods enter Gaza—and the 
donation of a security scanner by the Dutch 
government, COGAT continues to devise new 
methods to slow the entrance of construction 
materials through the crossing.30 In May 2016, 
Israel imposed a 45-day ban on the import of 
cement, because it accused Hamas of hijacking 
deliveries.31 COGAT also banned the import of 
wood planks, which it accused Hamas of using 
to buttress its extensive network of tunnels.32 
In terms of construction materials, cement and 
wood constitute basic elements required for the 
construction of homes, hospitals, and schools. 
Bans on the import of cement and lumber have 
signiicantly decreased the capacity for progress 
in Gaza’s reconstruction. Figure III displays the 
deicit of ABC materials required to complete the 
housing projects assessed by the MoPWH.33 he 
slow progress of construction projects proves that 
the continued blockade and control of movement 
imposed on Gaza by the Israeli government poses 
an exceptional obstruction to the improvement 
of the quality of life for Gaza’s residents.
30 Associated Press and Times of Israel Staf, “New Scanner at Gaza Crossing to Speed Rebuilding Efort,” Times of Israel, July 16, 2015, 
http://www.timesoisrael.com/new-scanner-at-gaza-crossing-to-speed-rebuilding-eforts/.
31 Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Israel Resumes Cement Shipments for Private Gaza Reconstruction After 45-Day Break,” Reuters, May 24, 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-cement-idUSKCN0YE11R.
32 Jefrey Heller, “Israel Cuts Back Gaza’s Lumber Imports – Palestinians,” Reuters, April 6, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-israel-
palestinians-gaza-idUKKBN0MX0SJ20150406. 
33 Shelter Cluster Palestine, “Key Facts (May 2016),” June 8, 2016, http://shelterpalestine.org/Upload/Doc/16e94567-472e-4675-8c50-
e69b32f055da.pdf. 
Figure III: Cement and Rebar Entered vs. Required Quantity (Tons) 
Source: Shelter Cluster Palestine, 2016
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COGAT, by stating accusations without 
providing hard evidence, continues to 
ban necessary construction materials from 
entering Gaza. he GRM could have been a 
shining example of joint Israeli-Palestinian 
cooperation, used as a framework for future 
collaborative projects, but instead COGAT 
found it suitable to abuse it. he purpose of 
the GRM was to share the responsibility of the 
reconstruction between diferent stakeholders 
in Gaza—including the Israelis—not leave it 
up to the party with the most power.
THE RIPPLE EFFECT
Maher al-Tabbaa, a Gazan economist and 
a spokesperson for the local chamber of 
commerce, asserts that COGAT’s restrictions 
on material imports amount to “economic 
warfare.”34 hose policies have had sizeable 
efects on Gaza’s overall economy. For 
instance, the Strip’s well-established furniture 
manufacturing industry can no longer make 
furniture because it lacks the raw materials to 
do so. As a result, these companies signiicantly 
downsized their labor force, delivering another 
punishing blow to a community that already 
struggled with high unemployment.35 
According to the U.N. Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA), “over 80 percent of the people in 
Gaza depend on humanitarian assistance.”36 
Another report by UNOCHA found that over 
80 percent of displaced Gazan families have 
borrowed money to get by in the past year, over 
85 percent purchased most of their food on 
credit, and over 40 percent have decreased their 
consumption of food.37 Although the GRM 
does not deal with the inancial problems of 
Gaza’s residents, the igures provided by those 
studies do reveal one of its shortcomings. It did 
not create the job boom in the construction 
sector predicted by those who helped develop 
it. Clearly, more economic opportunities are 
needed in Gaza, and the ripple efect initiated 
by the GRM has been far from positive. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
he absence of a long-term solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conlict leaves only one 
alternative to mitigate the sufering of Gaza’s 
people and prevent another cycle of war and 
destruction and that is to accelerate the speed 
of reconstruction. Noting the complications of 
reconstruction in Gaza created by the GRM, 
the blockade, and the Fatah-Hamas political 
deadlock, several actions could be taken to 
alleviate these problems.
After re-embarking on a path toward 
reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, the 
dissolution of the GRM should take precedent 
in any efort to revive the reconstruction of 
Gaza. A new mechanism that sees a stronger 
role in monitoring for both Gaza’s civil society 
and the donor community could inspire 
conidence in the process and increase donor 
inancial lows to the Strip. A greater focus on 
infrastructure projects would also ensure that 
the process generates maximum employment 
across Gaza.
REVIVE RECONCILIATION
he ongoing political deadlock in Palestinian 
politics guarantees the perpetual stagnation 
34 Heller, “Israel Cuts Back Gaza’s Lumber Imports.”
35 “Marketing of Furniture from Gaza in Israel Permitted—Wood to Make the Furniture is not,” Gisha Legal Center for the Freedom of 
Movement, November 2, 2015, http://gisha.org/en-blog/2015/11/02/marketing-of-furniture-from-gaza-in-israel-permitted-wood-to-the-
make-the-furniture-is-not/.
36 UNRWA, “Gaza Situation Report 149,” June 23, 2016, http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/emergency-reports/gaza-situation-report-149.
37 UNOCHA, “Gaza: Internally Displaced Persons,” 1.
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of Gaza’s reconstruction. Fatah and Hamas 
need to address each other’s economic and 
political grievances. Fortunately, an opening to 
reconcile Fatah and Hamas continues to grow, 
especially with the replacement of Khaled 
Mashaal—Hamas’s political chief—with 
former Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and the 
adoption of a new charter.38 he appointment 
of Haniyeh as Hamas’s political leader suggests 
that the organization looks to continue down 
a path of moderation, appeasing stakeholders 
in the region.39 hese developments signal 
to Fatah that Hamas wishes to re-engage in 
reconciliation talks.
Cairo, which controls one of the key 
crossings into Gaza, should continue 
to mediate between the two Palestinian 
factions. However, in order for Egypt to 
serve as an efective mediator, el-Sissi must 
irst reconcile with Hamas himself. Recent 
developments are signaling that this could 
soon be realized as well. Mohammed 
Dahlan—a former Fatah oicial despised by 
both Hamas and PA President Mahmoud 
Abbas—helped advance a reconciliation 
agreement between Egypt and Hamas.40 
Under the agreement, Hamas has agreed to 
establish a bufer zone along its border with 
Egypt. In a move that signaled its own good 
will, Egypt sent fuel to Gaza in June 2017 
to help alleviate the ongoing power crisis.41 
As reconciliation between Egypt and Hamas 
moves forward, el-Sissi should leverage his 
restored relationship with Hamas to mediate 
between it and Fatah. 
DISSOLVE THE GRM
In the meantime, the GRM should be dissolved. 
It is time to give Gazans ownership over 
reconstruction, allowing them to participate in 
the development of an alternative reconstruction 
mechanism. As mentioned before, Gaza’s civil 
society and de facto government were not 
consulted during the GRM’s planning process. 
herefore, the result of the agreement between 
COGAT, the PA, and the U.N. gave COGAT 
a disproportionate amount of power over the 
approval of construction materials. In addition 
to rearranging the power dynamics, empowering 
Gazan’s could also reduce costs and allow the 
U.N. to remove itself from a situation that greatly 
sullied its reputation as a thoughtful mediator 
in this conlict. An alternative mechanism 
could see a greater role for Gaza’s civil society 
in the monitoring of materials in conjunction 
with COGAT, while Hamas could be provided 
with greater responsibility over reconstruction, 
leaving them beholden to the satisfaction of 
Gaza’s citizens. 
Yet, a few matters should be put into 
consideration. Israeli security concerns 
regarding the dual-use of materials should 
not be discounted, but they should deinitely 
be addressed in a more eicient manner. 
Monitoring the usage of the construction 
materials by the HLST should not necessarily 
stop, but there should be more of an efort 
on the PA side to communicate more openly 
with Hamas. his issue could be dealt with 
during the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation talks 
38 Beverley Milton-Edwards, “Head-hunting for Hamas,” Markaz (blog), Brookings Institution, October 12, 2016, https://www.brookings.
edu/blog/markaz/2016/10/12/head-hunting-for-hamas/.
39 Joshua Mitnick and Rushdi Abualouf, “Hamas Selects Popular Gaza Politician Ismail Haniyeh as its New Leader,” Los Angeles Times, May 
6, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-hamas-leader-haniyeh-20170506-story.html.
40 Dylan Collins, “Will Mohammed Dahlan Return to Lead Gaza?” Al-Jazeera, July 10, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/fea-
tures/2017/07/mohammed-dahlan-return-lead-gaza-170709143522193.html; Peter Beaumont, “Hamas Seeks Help from Palestinian Foe 
to Relieve Pressure on Gaza,” he Guardian, July 9, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/09/hamas-seeks-help-from-pales-
tinian-foe-to-relieve-pressure-on-gaza.
41 Jack Khoury, “Gaza Electricity Worsens: Only Generating Plant and Power Lines from Egypt Shut Down,” Haaretz, July 13, 2017, http://
www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/1.801075.
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by stressing to Hamas the importance of 
cooperating with the reconstruction process. 
No materials should be diverted to reinforce 
tunnels or any other projects deemed hostile 
to either Fatah or Israel. his would be a tough 
sell to Hamas, but it would behoove Hamas 
to recognize the political capital it could gain 
by showing its willingness to cooperate in the 
reconstruction process. 
INTRODUCE DONOR MONITORS
A new mechanism to distribute reconstruction 
aid to Gazans will renew interest among 
international donors to fulill their pledges. 
For instance, Kuwait, traditionally one of the 
more proliic donors to Gaza’s reconstruction, 
refused to fulill its pledges because it 
recognized the ineiciency of the GRM.42 A 
positive change in the low of reconstruction 
could resuscitate the supply of donor aid. 
International organizations involved in 
reconstruction should use the new mechanism 
to encourage the fulillment of pledges made 
at the 2014 Cairo Conference. Additionally, 
regional actors should be encouraged to 
provide unilateral support to Gaza in an efort 
to expedite the reconstruction process. he 
Qatari unilateral model, although not perfect, 
seems to provide Gaza with better relief than 
the method provided by the GRM.43 Despite 
the recent Gulf crisis, Qatar recommitted its 
support to Gaza, diminishing the possibility 
of Hamas seeking patronage elsewhere, like 
Iran.44 Qatar’s envoy to Gaza, Mohammed al-
Emadi, continues to visit Gaza to oversee the 
projects his government funds to help rebuild 
areas destroyed by the war. 
Introducing a donor monitoring board is 
one way to further inspire conidence in 
donors, as it would give them a larger role in 
the reconstruction process.45 Previously, the 
GRM maintained a relatively small group of 
stakeholders in the reconstruction process. 
Allowing donors to monitor the projects 
through their own representatives would make 
them more comfortable with the reconstruction 
efort, inspiring them to fulill their pledges. 
Gaza’s civil society should be tasked with 
developing this multi-party board of trustees to 
ensure that the needs of Gaza’s residents receive 
consideration. Regional donors that were not 
satisied with the GRM should particularly be 
encouraged to participate. Countries that have 
either invested inancially in the reconstruction 
process or expressed security concerns about it 
should be included in this board of stakeholders. 
FOCUS ON INFRASTRUCTURE
To allow those funds to trickle down more 
efectively, the reconstruction efort should 
pivot toward infrastructure projects. According 
to an advisor with the Oice of the Quartet, the 
reconstruction eforts were meant to not only 
rebuild Gaza, but also to provide Gazans with 
job opportunities during the reconstruction 
efort.46 Housing reconstruction eforts have 
failed to do this. Vanity projects like shopping 
malls and elaborate mosques may improve 
the morale of some of Gaza’s citizens, but 
those projects do not improve their lives in 
the long-term. Infrastructure projects, such as 
desalination plants, power stations, and road 
revitalization, are more likely to create long-
term local jobs. 
42 Member of Gaza civil society, interview.
43 Khaled Abu Amer, “Qatar’s Lifeline to Gaza,” Al-Monitor, April 3, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/03/palestine-
qatar-reconstruction-committee-gaza-consensus.html.
44 “Qatar Envoy to Gaza Pledges Continued Support,” Al-Jazeera, July 10, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/qatar-envoy-gaza-
pledges-continued-support-170710070251325.html.
45 Member of Gaza civil society, interview.
46 Quartet oicial, interview.
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he reconciliation agreement that took 
place between Israel and Turkey last year 
provided a unique opportunity to make 
this a reality. hrough the reconciliation 
deal, Israel agreed to allow Turkey to send 
tons of humanitarian aid through the Israeli 
port of Ashdod, circumventing the blockade 
imposed by the Israeli military.47 he 
arrangement allowed Turkey to contribute to 
numerous infrastructure projects, including 
the construction of a desalination plant, 
power station, and hospital.48 Construction 
materials for the hospital have recently 
arrived in Ashdod, en route to Gaza.49 hose 
eforts will allow Gazans to not only rebuild 
their homes, but also to ind jobs that, at 
the very least, can temporarily provide them 
with the means to support their families. 
CONCLUSION
Opening up to alternatives through the 
empowerment of fresh, local perspectives is the 
only way to revive the reconstruction of Gaza. 
hese new possibilities will never realize their 
potential if the U.N. and other stakeholders—
Israel included—do not consider the repeal 
of the GRM. Denying Gazans the chance to 
improve their own lives will make Gaza even 
more like a prison, and as the U.N. report on 
Gaza concluded, “he daily lives of Gazans in 
2020 will be worse than they are now.”50 What 
that would look like is unfathomable, because 
Gaza is already uninhabitable today. If such 
a political breakthrough materializes, years of 
restrictions placed on Gaza could diminish. 
Construction materials and employment 
opportunities would return to this once 
thriving community. On the other hand, 
sustaining the status quo in Gaza will mark 
another failure in the history of humanitarian 
aid, calling into question the utility and 
purpose of international aid organizations. 
47 Orr Hirschauge, Ned Levin, and Ayla Albayrak, “Israel and Turkey to Restore Full Diplomatic Ties,” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2016, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/israel-and-turkey-to-restore-full-diplomatic-ties-1466965042.
48 Barak Ravid, “Israel and Turkey Oicially Announce Rapprochement Deal, Ending Diplomatic Crisis,” Haaretz, June 27, 2016, http://
www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.727369.
49 “Materials for Building Turkish Hospital, Reached Ashdod, will Arrive Soon in Gaza, Haniyeh says,” Daily Sabah, July 5, 2017, https://
www.dailysabah.com/mideast/2017/07/05/materials-for-building-turkish-hospital-reached-ashdod-will-soon-arrive-in-gaza-haniyeh-says.
50 United Nations Country Team in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, “Gaza in 2020: A Livable Place?” August 2012, 16. https://www.
unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/gaza-2020-liveable-place.
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